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Abstracts
This essay focuses on the relationship between solipsism and aesthetic 
subjectivity, as outlined in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, especially considering the 
relationship between solipsism and art’s “subjective point of reference”. For 
this purpose, I reconstruct Adorno’s relevant ideas on the role of subjectivity 
within art and relate them to his elaborated analysis of the process of aesthe-
tic experience. Finally, I scrutinize the value of the non-apodictic truth, this 
experience reveals, and also its relationship to particular aspects of “truth-con-
tent” and to Adorno’s redemption of the artwork’s fragile ontological status, 
its semblance character.
In diesem Beitrag wird Adornos Korrelation von erkenntnistheoretischem 
Solispismus und ästhetischer Subjektivität oder “subjektivem Bezugspunkt 
von Kunst”, untersucht und rekonstruiert. Zu diesem Zweck werden Ador-
nos relevante Gedanken, die die Rolle der Subjektivität in der Kunst anbe-
treffen, rekonstruiert und ihre mögliche konzeptuelle Beziehung zu seiner 
differenzierten Analyse des Begriffs der ästhetischen Erfahrung untersucht; 
ästhetische Erfahrung beinhaltet eine rein subjektiv offenbarte Wahrheit des 
Kunstwerks, der, trotzdem, Objektivität zuerkannt wird. Zum Schluss wird 
der Wert dieser nicht apodiktischer Wahrheit und seine mögliche Beziehung 
zum Begriff des “Wahrheitsgehalts” und zu Adornos Rettung des fragilen on-
tologischen Status der Kunstwerks, seines “Scheincharakters”, überprüft.
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I. Introduction: individuation and collectivity in artistic production
Just at the beginning of Aesthetic Theory, Adorno points out that 
in the first half of the 20th century art lost its self-evidence as 
far as it concerns its inner life, its relation to the world, even its 
right to exist1. This could be demonstrated on the gradual insti-
tutionalization and commercialization of great art of the past 
through new technical means of preservation and reproduction, 
and on the marginalization of modernistic art, which the philis-
tine cliché faced “as ugly as the world in which it originates” (AT, 
260). Adorno had many reasons to ascertain a marginalization 
of modernistic art according to his aesthetic values. In a ration-
alized world towards production and economic growth, culture 
industry dominated and art experienced a gradual “deaestheti-
zation”. Consequently, not commercial or not committed artistic 
creation, which opposed social trends, tended to become a 
refuge of oppressed social groups, an attitude of unconventional 
individuals. Adorno knew that this had always been the fate 
of artistic expression in bourgeois society, also during historical 
periods, not dominated by culture industry; autonomous and, 
eventually, oppositional art presupposes namely an inner need 
for expression. This need, channeled into artistic expression 
before succeeding to the artwork’s reification and not consid-
ered as profession within “administered” society, implies first 
of all an “element of inwardness” (AT, 116) and individuation; 
traditionally, whoever wants to become an artist often ignores 
social conventions, clichés and requirements, by trying to follow 
inner motivations, visions and obsessions. This attitude may 
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also imply avoidance of administered working conditions and 
the alleged autonomy of “reified division of labor” (AT, 259). In 
addition, modern, industrialized and instrumentalized society, 
as acknowledged by Adorno, primarily didn’t ask for artists but 
for other professions, thus trying to alienate artistic activities 
and art in a “natural reserve for irrationalism” (AT, 336)2. Never-
theless, while acknowledging the possibility of “collective labor 
in art” (AT, 42) in the kind of Schoenberg’s, somehow renais-
sance and at the same time visionary, idea of collective forms of 
production in composer workshops (AT, 231) the ideal of the 
autonomous artist-hero of the 19th century on which Adorno 
still hangs, is a path of individuation and antithesis to society. 
Although there might also be other paths of radical individua-
tion in thinking and acting, the artistic is the most idiosyncratic: 
it primarily concerns a domain of privacy and intimacy; “Art 
cannot be isolated from expression, and there is no expression 
without subject” (AT, 42). But even epistemological aspects of 
artistic creation, as for example the “appropriation” of techni-
cal-theoretical “discoveries” of a historic era by an artist (AT, 
192), are being realized through a mirror of reflected subjec-
tivity as a result of personal choice. The latter appear within 
artistic activity as “personality” and constitute a quality that 
distinguishes artworks from one another.
There are occasional statements on the relationship between 
art and solipsism in Aesthetic Theory, which suggest different 
aspects of the function and content of art. Solipsism, on the one 
hand, is a general “standpoint of radical modernism”, realized in 
atomistic society through “reified division of labor” (AT, 259). 
Artistic creation takes place within society and, according to 
Adorno, constitutes social production. Production of a particular 
artwork “demands the division of labor” (AT, 167). Given this 
established structure of production in modern society, atomistic 
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attitudes may also refer to artistic creation (production) thus 
pointing to a kind of societal solipsism. In addition according to 
Adorno, from an external point of view, art, especially modern-
istic art, may appear with solipsistic and fetishistic attitudes, 
as for example in its precarious, for its survival, insistence on 
inner coherence (AT, 228). He therefore relates art’s purported 
autarky to the “persuasive force” of an argument of dialectical 
materialism (Lukács’s attack) concerning the solipsistic stand-
point of radical modernism “that of a monad that obstinately 
barricades itself against intersubjectivity” (AT, 259). Indirectly 
and occasionally, Adorno makes fruitful correlations between 
this standpoint and a general characteristic of art, its autono-
mous character. Actually, he should unfold an argumentation 
toward the sociologically solipsistic attitudes of autonomous 
art and artist, in other words to find a relationship between 
autonomy and solipsism. However, he does not. Indeed this 
could be reconstructed from scattered relevant statements in 
Aesthetic Theory. Autonomy and solipsism, though referring 
primarily to different contexts — sociological and cognitive 
respectively and with the former being broader than the latter– 
converge within a standpoint of the creative subject; in a stand-
point of autarky, independence and introspection. For art itself 
this suggests a defensive standpoint of denial of social func-
tionality endangered from the precarious ideology of l ’art pour 
l ’art, and a denial of any purpose as commodity. In addition, it 
suggests a denial of convenient social affirmations in the form 
of “dubious social-political commitment” (AT, 228) and “choice 
of [relevant] subject matter” (AT, 321). However, Adorno’s main 
concern remains the highlighting of art’s intersubjectivity, in 
other words, the dialectical coexistence of subject and society 
within the artwork. 
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At the same time, solipsism also constitutes a long standing 
philosophical hypothesis, which concerns existence, and the 
truth value of perception. Therefore, Adorno’s brief statements 
on solipsism in Aesthetic Theory designate different phenomena 
under the same heading; these concern cognitive, sociological 
and existential aspects of artistic creation, aesthetic experi-
ence and of the artwork’s content. Due to his above mentioned 
main concern, he often undertakes abrupt conceptual transi-
tions within these aspects. In this essay I will mainly focus on 
the cognitive aspect, especially on Adorno’s significant state-
ment about the “subjective point of reference in art […] that 
which solipsism has merely feigned in reality” (AT, 42). For this 
purpose, I will reconstruct Adorno’s relevant references on the 
role of subjectivity within art and relate them to his statements 
on the subject-object confrontation in the process of aesthetic 
experience. Adorno considers aesthetic experience as objective 
understanding by locating in this confrontation a possibility of 
objectivity and truth, experienced subjectively. Therefore, I will 
scrutinize the value of truth, which could be articulated from, 
according to Adorno, an immanent solipsistic standpoint — 
this of the individuality, exclusivity and inwardness of aesthetic 
experience and artistic creation. Subsequently, I will relate it to 
particular aspects of “truth-content” and finally to the concepts 
of “semblance and “remembrance”. Taking into consideration 
Adorno’s above mentioned abrupt conceptual transitions, I will 
also explore the sociological aspect towards his significant state-
ment that “art is the historicophilosophical truth of a solipsism 
that is untrue in-itself ” (AT, 42); I will relate this statement to 
Adorno’s highlighting of art’s “double character”, namely, its 
manifestation as “autonomous phenomenon” and “fait social”.
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II. Art’s immanent subjectivity 
How could art be related to a doubtful philosophical hypoth-
esis as solipsism is? Adorno’s main statement for such a rela-
tion is an initial and general observation concerning the lack 
of spirit in modern society: “In the contemporary social situa-
tion spirit is present only by virtue of the principium individ-
uationis”. Therefore, the “most progressive consciousness […] 
today is exclusively that of the individual” (AT, 42). However, as 
mentioned in the introduction, he makes an abrupt transition 
from the sociological (also) to the cognitive level: “the extin-
guishing of art’s immanent subjectivity” is inconceivable and 
generally art suggests a “subjective point of reference” (AT, 42). 
Repeatedly, in different contexts and through versatile formu-
lations, Adorno refers to this cardinal characteristic of art. For 
example, he emphasizes the importance of the “immediacy of 
experience” (AT, 259) and the value of “lived perception” (AT, 
345) when elaborating the process of aesthetic experience “as 
objective understanding”. Respectively, as far as it concerns 
artistic creation, he stresses the role of expression within art and 
thereby the latter’s dependence on a subject (AT, 42). However, 
the latter remains a general statement; as it will be stated later in 
this section, Adorno sets many restrictions on any decisive role 
of the artistic subject for the artwork’s reification. Nevertheless, 
art’s “immanent subjectivity” and “subjective point of reference” 
refer both to aesthetic experience and artistic creation. Actu-
ally, when referring to this aspect of art, Adorno’s distinction 
between aesthetic experience and artistic creation is not always 
obvious. I will first focus on the former.
Whereas science doubts on the validity of knowledge 
arising directly from the data of sensual perception, aesthetic 
experience indispensably begins with immediate contact to the 
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artwork through sensual perception “otherwise it [art] would 
be indistinguishable from science” (AT, 259). One could object 
that this is just the way any experience of the world begins with. 
But within the aesthetic domain, immediate contact to the 
artwork, which presupposes sensorial awareness, stresses subjec-
tive engagement. This doesn’t constitute an abstract-conceptual, 
exemplary and intersubjective starting point, thus outlining 
initially an epistemology of the process we gain knowledge of 
the world. It implies a special and indispensable commitment 
towards the potential “perceptibility” of the art-object, and 
respective “attentiveness”3 of the subject (and maybe mutual 
alignment between them). Adorno considers this kind of subjec-
tive openness towards perception as a general cognitive virtue, 
which concerns not only aesthetic experience; as he states, “yet 
obdurate thought cheats itself of the element of receptivity, 
without which it is no longer thought” (AT, 346). In addition, 
“lived perception” implies privacy; it is the attentiveness of the 
individual recipient to which artworks respond and “open their 
eyes under [his] gaze” (AT, 275). These unavoidable precondi-
tions of sensual receptivity and intimacy towards the artwork 
underpin what Adorno considers as “lived perception”. They 
constitute an indispensable, not necessarily, initial “layer” of 
aesthetic experience. It is the immediate attentiveness, percep-
tion and emotional engagement of the particular subject which 
first of all the artwork requires and not a mediated knowledge, 
e.g. through evaluation by others and through conceptual under-
standing. Furthermore, it is not the collective and anonymized 
perception and experience of the products of culture industry.
However, the above statements do not guarantee an objec-
tive aesthetic judgment beyond the contingency of “psychological 
3  W. Benjamin, On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, in Illuminations, trans. Harry 
Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt, Schocken Books, New York 1969, 188.
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emotions”, even if they arise from an immediate contact to the 
artwork. They also do not refer to a strong condition for mutual 
alignment between artwork and recipient. Moreover, they do 
not really distinguish “real experience” from “artistic experience” 
(AT, 164), thus pointing to the way, art becomes distinguish-
able from science. Therefore, art’s “immanent subjectivity” and 
“subjective point of reference” would appear as a flaw without 
any claim for objective judgment towards the truth-content of 
the artistic object. However, if taking into consideration Ador-
no’s statements on the equivocalness of subjectivity and objec-
tivity within art and his critique on Kant’s concept of objectivity 
in aesthetic judgment, these necessary distinctions become clear. 
Adorno’s Aesthetics are definitely work-centered. He acknowl-
edges Kant’s efforts to establish “a subjectively mediated but 
objective aesthetics” (AT, 163). However, he also has two main 
objections. The first is an epistemological one, through which art 
indeed becomes distinguishable from science and its subjective 
point of reference plausible. As he states, the “subjective query”, 
the Kantian judgment of taste requires, 
is itself more aesthetic than is the epistemological intention obliqua 
because the objectivity of the artwork is mediated in a manner that is 
qualitatively different from the objectivity of knowledge, being me-
diated more specif ically through the subject (AT, 163-164, emphasis 
mine). 
However, Adorno doesn’t, at least in this context, explicate the 
specificity of this mediation and “the modification of real expe-
rience by artistic experience” (AT, 164). Apart from the repeat-
edly emphasized feature of this specificity – the importance of 
“lived perception” – he provides this explication indirectly by 
articulating his second objection. Although Kant defines beauty 
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as “that which pleases universally without requiring a concept”4, 
at the same time he also introduces two requirements: univer-
sality and implicit necessity of the judgment. These however are 
concepts. Since being concepts, they do not provide a distinc-
tion between real- and artistic experience, but “reproduce the 
deterministic mechanisms of empirical reality” (AT, 165). Thus, 
they draw back the subjective query of artistic experience to an 
epistemological intention obliqua, whereas Adorno aims to an 
“aconceptual” aesthetic experience. This experience implies an 
aconceptual immediate “attentiveness”. Furthermore, the unity 
of these concepts, realized, according to Kant, through “the act 
of pleasing” (AT, 165) within the subject, is insofar external to 
the artwork. However, the act of pleasing, which according to 
Adorno should be replaced by a higher level of aesthetic expe-
rience, cannot remain external to (and independent from) the 
artwork:
The strongest buttress of subjective aesthetics, the concept of aesthetic 
feeling, derives from objectivity, not the reverse. Aesthetic feeling says 
that something is thus” […]“Aesthetic feeling is not the feeling that is 
aroused: It is astonishment vis-a-vis what is beheld rather than visa- 
vis what it is about; it is a being overwhelmed by what is aconceptual 
and yet determinate, not the subjective affect released, that in the case 
of aesthetic experience may be called feeling. It goes to the heart of the 
matter, is the feeling for it and not a reflex of the observer (AT, 164, 
emphasis mine). 
Consequently, the subjective point of reference in art, is not 
psychological emotions, validated through their common 
appearance in the experiences of other individuals. It is consti-
tuted by subjective feelings under a precondition, aroused from 
the specific case every artwork constitutes –its objectivity, which 
4 I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Hackett Publish-
ing, Indianapolis 1987, 64, cited after Adorno, AT, 164.
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contrary to Kant remains indictable from “universally concep-
tual formalization” (AT, 165). True art, especially modern art, 
inherently contradicts conceptual formalization of taste. By 
criticizing Kant’s concept of objectivity in aesthetic judgment, 
Adorno finally formulates a paradox concerning the universal 
value of aesthetic judgment through formalization; the latter 
constitutes an “act of subjective reason” and insofar is exposed 
to contingency. Perhaps this paradox sounds hyperbolic. On the 
other hand it complies with Adorno’s work-centered Aesthetics 
and the specificity and dignity of the work, about which “no 
single rule by which the judgment of taste must subsume, not 
even the totality of these rules, has anything to say” (AT, 166). 
In the specificity of its reification, the artwork implies a peculiar 
truth, experienced individually by the subject. In so far, it points 
to an “aconceptual”, not apodictic and, insofar, solipsistic truth, 
appearing through the art-object and in the devoted spectator.
The above mentioned higher level the act of pleasing 
should, according to Adorno, be ideally replaced with, is the 
“shock aroused by important works” and “the moment of being 
shaken” (AT, 244). In this case, art’s “subjective point of refer-
ence […] which solipsism feigned in reality” (AT, 42) becomes 
evident: “the possibility of truth, embodied in the aesthetic 
image, becomes tangible [leibhaft]” (AT, 244). Even if this truth 
(or untruth) constitutes an immanent and objective character-
istic of the particular artwork, it has to be subjectively experi-
enced: “it is irruption of objectivity into subjective conscious-
ness” (AT, 245). Art inherently aims to a subject or, as mentioned 
above in Adorno’s words, “the objectivity of the artwork is being 
mediated more specifically through the subject” (AT, 164). This 
“more specific” is an immediate mediation, lacking, according 
to Adorno’s differentiation from Kant and in contrast to inten-
tion obliqua, the reference to universal concepts and categories: 
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“What each artwork would need to be according to its pure 
concept is essential to none” (AT, 166). Thus, Adorno, in contrast 
to Kant, distinguishes artistic from real experience and points to 
the reason “why people expose themselves to aesthetic experi-
ence in the first place” (AT, 164); it is a desire for becoming 
“overwhelmed” and enchanted, if not by the Kantian sublime, at 
least by the artwork’s factual spell and maybe truth.
By locating objectivity within the artwork and by acknowl-
edging the irruption of this objectivity into the subject, he 
outlines the conditions for mutual alignment between them. 
The significance of this irruption becomes evident in Adorno’s 
reference to the moments of “shudder” and “liquidation of the 
I” during the subjective encounter with “important works” (AT, 
245). This transient weakening and, as Adorno states, not “disap-
pearance” of the subject does not point to a questioning of “art’s 
subjective point of reference”. Rather, it validates a standpoint of 
receptivity and immediate experience through the irruption of 
an external, objective truth, reified by the artwork. Thus, through 
this alignment, a necessarily subjective and individual stand-
point of receptivity, this of an “aconceptual” aesthetic experience, 
provides the conditions for the “possibility of truth to become 
tangible”. In other words, it validates a solipsistic standpoint. 
Before exploring the eventual truth-value of this subjectively 
experienced objectivity reified trough the artwork, I will return 
to the above mentioned aspect of art’s “immanent subjectivity” 
and “subjective point of reference”, as far as it concerns artistic 
creation.
Whereas Adorno acknowledges the subjectivity and indi-
viduality of artistic expression and perception when pointing 
to the fact that art “is nevertheless bound up with feeling, with 
the immediacy of experience” (AT, 259), at the same time he 
explores the limits of the subject’s involvement in artistic crea-
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tion, questioning its decisive role in the artwork’s formation. In 
other words, he challenges the amateurish idea of artistic crea-
tion from a state of “tabula rasa”. This becomes evident among 
others in his critique of the psychoanalytic theory of art, in the 
questioning of the role of artistic intention, in the challenging of 
“inwardness” and “expression” and in the emphasis on art’s, even 
latent, collective social subject and language character. I will here 
focus on the three aspects of Adorno’s questioning, leaving the 
fourth for the next section of this essay. As he repeatedly states, 
antithesis to society is immanent in art. This antithesis suggests 
an esoteric domain, “an inward space of men”, which plausibly 
implies interpretations based on a “theory of psychic life” (AT, 
8). Psychoanalytic theory aims to interpret artworks as “uncon-
scious projections” of their creators. However, Adorno states that 
in the creative process projections constitute “one element and 
hardly the definitive one” in contrast to “idiom and material” 
(AT, 8), which, as will be stated in the next section of this essay, 
transcend the scope of the creative subject in being historically 
and sociologically determined. Insofar, artworks are not psycho-
analytic “documents” of the core of subjectivity –the subcon-
scious life. Psychoanalytic theory might “bring to light what is 
internal to art”, as biographical facts are, but at the same time 
“not artistic”. It “unlocks phenomena” but not the “phenomenon 
of art”, that is the artwork’s “objectivity” and “inner consistency”, 
beyond artistic intentions. “Unconscious forces” may serve as 
primary “impulse” in artistic creation. However, they remain just 
“material among many others”(AT, 8-9) which find their way in 
artistic creation thus explaining a subjective need for creation, 
even as a syndrome. They illuminate rather the factual aspect 
of this process and not its outcome, the reified artistic object. 
Therefore, as Adorno states, artworks are “incomparably less a 
copy and possession of the artist” (AT, 9) than a psychoanalyst 
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could imagine. Repeatedly he stresses the fact that the artist has 
to face the difficulties of form and material and master anti-
thetical forces within them, which transcend his initial feelings, 
intentions and conceptions. And during the adventure of artistic 
creation he might fail to realize them, even the work itself. In 
the same way, as the art recipient has to control his initial feel-
ings when facing the artwork through a form of “self-denial”, 
the creator has to emancipate himself from them: 
Aesthetic relinquishment in the artwork requires not a weak or con-
formist ego but a forceful one. Only the autonomous self is able to 
turn critically against itself and break through its illusory imprison-
ment (AT, 116-117). 
Once again, by delimiting the role of subjectivity in the process 
of artistic creation, Adorno does not eliminate the “subjec-
tive point of reference in art” and its “immanent subjectivity”. 
Rather, he recasts a view from an inevitable subjective stand-
point, aiming to discover the possibility of an articulated objec-
tivity and truth-value of non-subjective origin.
All the above statements point to a premise of interiority for 
art and its appreciation. As Peter Gordon points out, in Aesthetic 
Theory Adorno reexamines the relevance of Kierkegaard’s 
“philosophy of inwardness” for modern art5. Any attempt of 
Adorno to salvage modernistic and new art in relation to an 
“ideology of inwardness” has complex implications. On the one 
hand, in the 20th century the autonomous subject experiences, 
through working conditions and domination of culture industry, 
a “growing powerlessness” (AT, 116). Therefore, “inwardness” 
tends to become ideology, an illusory, consolatory “mirage of 
an inner kingdom”. But since the subject forfeits his power 
5 P. Gordon, Adorno and Existence, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA) 2016, 189.
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and autonomy, this kind of inwardness becomes “shadowy and 
empty, indeed contentless in itself ”. Given the fact that Adorno 
stresses a little later in Aesthetic Theory the importance of dialec-
tical conception of inwardness, we could read his reference to 
subjective emptiness both from the point of view of the subject 
and of the object-society. “What is denied [the subject] socially” 
(AT, 116) through “reified division of labor”, which he has to 
“perform”, is a meaningful participation to social reality, thus to 
external objectivity. In that way subjectivity becomes “empty” and 
“shadowy”, since not dialectically validated through the external 
opposite. Thus, society vanishes in the subject’s precarious intro-
spection. Such an illusory and empty inwardness would imply 
a socially solipsistic standpoint. But since it also constitutes a 
general presupposition for artistic creation and aesthetic expe-
rience, it would justify, contra Adorno, in such a socially uncon-
scious and narrow-minded form, Lukács’s “attack on radical 
modern art’ (AT, 43) through an alignment of a societal-episte-
mological handicap to aesthetics6. At the same time, the power-
less subject, not being able for critical self-reflection, becomes 
in David Riesman’s terminology to which Adorno refers, 
“outer-directed”, concessional and easily assimilated, surren-
dering to stimuli of external reality. Thus, the subject vanishes 
in society’s manifoldness. Consequently, he may easily become 
exposed to the sirens of culture industry. Actually, in front of 
the latter’s domination, modernistic art itself needs inwardness 
in order to retain its autonomy and dignity7. However, if art, as 
reaction, follows a convenient, peaceful standpoint of introspec-
6 Cf. J. Baldacchino, Post-Marxist Marxism: Questioning the Answer, Rout-
ledge, London 2018, 121.
7 For the relationship between art’s autonomy and dignity cf. A. Heller, 
Autonomy of Art or the Dignity of the Artwork, in Aesthetics and Modernity, ed. 
John Rundel, Lexington Books, Lanham 2011, 47-64.
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tion and uncritical solipsistic inwardness, it will become untruth 
and harmless. Here appears the aporia of art’s autonomy: 
If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers itself over to the machinations of 
the status quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it nonetheless submits 
to integration as one harmless domain among others (AT, 237). 
On the contrary, according to Adorno, art’s societal character 
consists in its attitude towards society: its sociality means 
“immanent movement against society” and its “asociality is 
determinate negation to society” (AT, 226-227). In addition, 
there also are special art-historical reasons for Adorno’s critique 
of the ideology of inwardness. He refers to them indirectly, 
indeed ex negativo: by pointing to their ideological abuse. The 
“denunciation of radically expressive works as being examples 
of hyperbolic late romanticism” constitutes actually not only a 
“predictable babble of all those who favor a return to the pristine” 
(AT, 116). For a proponent of radical modernism as Adorno, 
any return to aesthetic psychologism, would mean regression. 
However, he also acknowledge that the once fruitful “antipsy-
chologism” of radical modernism, demonstrated by Adorno in 
the latter’s contempt of Jugendstil and meta-romantic inward-
ness, “shifts its function”, becoming “socialized and service-
able to the status quo” towards aesthetic primitivism. “Yet art 
is scarcely imaginable without the element of inwardness” 
(AT, 116). How could consequently Adorno find a mediation 
between the salvation of inwardness, as Kierkegaard introduced 
it, and Benjamin’s critique of “abstract subjectivity that power-
lessly sets itself up as a substance” (AT, 116)? “The element of 
inwardness” refers namely to art’s “immanent subjectivity” and 
“subjective point of reference”. On the other hand, “abstract 
subjectivity as a substance”, “arrogates all objective reality to its 
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own inner sphere”8. In that case, “aesthetic self-relinquishment 
in the artwork” and the latter’s objectivation would be impos-
sible. The mediation lies in the dialectical conception of inward-
ness, demonstrated aesthetically with an analogy, once more 
of musical origin9: “Beethoven is, in modified yet determinate 
fashion, the full experience of external life returning inwardly” 
(AT, 116-117). Analogously, as mentioned above, “only the 
autonomous self is able to turn critically against itself and break 
through its illusory imprisonment”. Thus, the “forceful”, auton-
omous, not conformist ego, is able for aesthetic externalization 
to the artistic object, both as creator and spectator. By turning 
“critically against itself ” the artistic ego escapes from the solip-
sistic boundaries of its purported autarky; the “illusory impris-
onment” now collapses in front of the movement of the subject 
towards the objectivity of the artwork; the artist faces the above 
mentioned problems of mastering antithetical forces in mate-
rial and form. These forces are determined from the course of 
history beyond the realm of subjectivity. He faces finally the 
consequences of creation – his creatures while acquiring inde-
pendence from him. The Swedish poet, Tomas Tranströmer 
describes this process masterfully:
Fantastic to feel how my poem grows
while I myself shrink.
It grows, it takes my place.
8  Gordon, Adorno and Existence, 190.
9 See, f.i., another analogy in his statement that the reciprocity be-
tween intellectual-reflective and sensual moments in the process of 
aesthetic experience can be paradigmatically demonstrated in the 
process of “structural listening” to musical works (AT, 337-338; Der 
getreue Korrepetitor. Lehrschriften zur musikalischen Praxis, in Gesam-
melte Schriften 15, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 
1997, 186.
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It pushes me aside.
It throws me out of the nest.
The poem is ready10.
III. Art’s truth and social mediation
Adorno’s questioning of any definite and exclusive role of the 
spontaneous involvement of subjectivity within artistic crea-
tion and aesthetic experience points to moments of “critical 
self-reflection”. However, such moments constitute the way 
epistemology generally “destroys the spell of solipsism”. In the 
aesthetic domain, moments of critical self-reflection, which 
challenge the autarky of the creative and experiencing subject, 
limit their tendencies to self-projection. On the other hand, it 
is exactly the “subjective point of reference in art that solipsism 
feigned in reality” (AT, 42). Does then this point of reference 
give a promise of accessing truth and what kind of truth could 
that be? There are two reasons to explore any truth value that 
could eventually be articulated from art’s standpoint. The first 
is exactly the fact that solipsism imitates art’s subjective point 
of reference “in reality”; that means that solipsism, as cogni-
tive, though anti-epistemological standpoint, acknowledges and 
tries to imitate a peculiar autarky in the individuality of aesthetic 
experience and artistic creation. Thus, aesthetic ‘knowledge’ gives 
the promise of accessing truth, beyond the apodictic obligations 
of epistemology and the universal validity of concepts. As John 
Baldacchino puts it, “art’s right to solipsism frees it from the 
epistemological legislation of an identitarian totality”11; this 
totality appears, among others, as instrumental significance 
of universal concepts for accessing truth. The second reason is 
10 T. Tranströmer, Morning Birds from Bells and Tracks (1966), in New 
Collected Poems, trans. R. Fulton, Bloodaxe Books, Hexham 2011, 75.
11 Baldacchino, Post-Marxist Marxism, 123.
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indeed Adorno’s persuasion that through aesthetic experience 
and confrontation with the artwork the art-recipient attains 
a privileged access to an objective truth “embodied in the 
aesthetic image” (AT, 244). Indeed, in another context Adorno 
also explores the ontological domain of art and the possibility 
that it may express a kind of truth, that could become “tangible” 
to the subject though the process of aesthetic experience. But 
he doesn’t just explore how art could be and thus express truth 
but what kind of truth this could be. For this purpose, he has 
to undertake two hard tasks; the redemption of art’s mode of 
manifestation, its semblance-character as ontological domain 
and possible locus of appearance of truth, and the outlining of 
art’s methexis in truth despite its semblance character, in other 
words, the redemption of semblance as semblance of truth. Each 
of these tasks can be understood as implicitly referring to two 
criteria for evaluation of art’s claim to truth: being and content, 
respectively.
Adorno poses the crucial question “how can making bring 
into appearance what is not the result of making; how can what 
according to its own concept is not true nevertheless be true?” 
(AT, 107) given the fact that the truth cannot be something 
made. What is evident in the artwork’s objectivation is defi-
nitely its sensuous character. However, “usually the semblance 
character of artworks has been associated with their sensuous 
element, especially in Hegel’s formulation of the sensuous 
semblance of the idea” (AT, 108). Therefore, Adorno first of all 
has to undertake the redemption of semblance in its sensuous 
appearance. Indeed, even the pure objectivation of an artwork 
points inevitable to its semblance character; for instant, a picture 
pretends the process, which it represents. In order to salvage the 
semblance character of the artwork, Adorno on the one hand 
transforms the artwork’s sensuous element, its Hegelian “being-
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in-itself ”, from an ontological disadvantage, arising from its 
state of ontological unfulfillment, to an ontic privilege. This can 
be related to his repeated efforts to highlight and emphasize the 
above mentioned perceptual analogue: the importance of the 
“immediacy of experience” and the value of “lived perception” 
during the process of aesthetic experience. As Albrecht Wellmer 
states, this constitutes a privilege of art and, consequently, of 
aesthetic experience in comparison to “discursive cognition”12. 
On the other hand, the semblance character of the artworks 
points to an external, archetypal locus of truth, this of the “active 
spirit” (AT, 107). However, this autarchic and privileged “being-
for-itself ” of spirit, its intangibility, is now being transformed 
by Adorno to an ontic disadvantage; in view of the sphere of 
Dasein, spirit remains “necessarily illusory”: 
All spirit, χωρίς from the corporeal, has in itself the aspect of raising 
what does not exist, what is abstract, to existence; this is the truth 
element of nominalism. Art carries out the test of the illusoriness of 
spirit as that of an essence sui generis by taking at its word spirit’ 
s claim to be an entity and placing it as such before the eyes. It is 
this, much more than the imitation of the sensual world by aesthetic 
sensuousness, that art has learned to renounce and that compels art to 
semblance (AT, 108). 
Thus, towards the being-in-itself of Dasein, spirit remains 
semblance. Only through the reification of the artwork and 
through its sensuous element it might appear “before the eyes”. 
It needs the artwork towards its “claim to be an entity”. This 
claim can be fulfilled in the ontological topos of the Hege-
lian existent, in the sphere of sensuous being. Otherwise spirit 
would remain abstract and intangible or pure subject to belief, 
12  A. Wellmer, Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung. Adornos ästhetische Rettung der 
Modernität, in Adorno-Konferenz 1983, eds. L. von Friedeburg & J. Ha-
bermas, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1983, 142-143 (my translation).
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as Holly spirit is, which hopefully also may (according to those 
who believe to him) appear through a sensuously perceivable 
miracle or humanly reification “before the eyes”. Consequently, 
according to Adorno’s subversion of traditional Aesthetics, 
the semblance character of the artwork doesn’t arise from its 
sensuous element but from “the placing before the eyes” of an 
abstract entity, which remains illusory per se, in other words, 
semblance. At the same time, artworks, as such, are purposeless 
in a Kantian sense, which Adorno adopts; by resisting thingness 
they are not useful objects and “have their locus on the side of 
appearances”. But what appears is at the same time essence, the 
manifestation of spirit, of the nonexistent in aesthetic means. In 
so far, artworks are appearances (of spirit).
Finally, the redemption of semblance, “usually associated” 
(AT, 107) with the artwork’s Dasein, becomes possible through 
the latter’s correlation with the locus of truth, spirit. In a state 
of oscillation between the moments of conceptual truth and 
“nonexistence and negativity” towards sensuous being, spirit 
“enters” the artwork. The artwork carries out this nonexist-
ence and negativity as a kind of guilt and “seeks to salvage”, 
through aesthetic semblance, “what is reduced to its material” 
(AT, 107). Only indirectly, Adorno here explicates the “refracted 
existence” of the “nonexistent” -spirit in the artwork’s “appear-
ance” (AT, 109): it is the “relation of [the artwork’s] elements to 
each other”, through which “exclusively artworks become spirit” 
(AT, 108). We could also take into consideration his dispersed 
hints on the notion of the “content” (Gehalt), which in being 
“distinct from semblance” and the immediate existence of the 
artwork, constitutes for the latter the only possible bearer of 
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truth (and spirit) and the real “issue”13 in any relevant question14. 
Elsewhere, Adorno introduces different parameters to outline 
the artwork’s reification, among them technique and content15. 
Technique and content stand in a dialectical relationship. He 
distinguishes them by pointing to the fact that content, in 
contrast to technique, is not made. Adorno’s paradigm, indi-
viduality as content in Shakespeare’s works, is supported by a 
technique of succession of short scenes. Content appears as the 
non-sensuous, abstract result in the materialistic and sensuous 
means of a serving and thus, relevant and efficient, technique. 
As not made, it may have claim to truth because truth cannot be 
made. Therefore, the locus of any claim of truth is the content of 
the work, which, through this indicator and claim, may become 
truth-content. The spirit “enters” the artwork through the 
content. To continue Adorno’s thoughts, its preliminary “nonex-
istence and negativity” is perhaps manifested in the dependency 
of content on the efficiency of technique, the made; finally on 
the latter’s artistic functionality.
However, Adorno also adheres to the traditional under-
standing of the artwork’s semblance character; artworks are 
semblance by helping what they cannot be, the unmade truth 
of spirit, to a “second-order, modified existence” in the sphere of 
being (AT, 109). The aesthetic realization, which serves as cradle 
for a modified existence of what artworks cannot be – spirit 
13 Cf. AT, 107;131.
14 Adorno also introduces another, materialistic meaning of content (Ger-
man, “Inhalt”) as far as it concerns the musical work. He defines Inhalt of a 
musical work as “everything that transpires in time”, e.g. “changing [sonic] 
situations” (AT 147; cf. also Kriterien der neuen Musik, in Gesammelte Schiften 
16 (Musikalische Schriften I), 221-222. However, these situations cannot be 
distinct from the sensuous moment, thus from semblance in the initial, tra-
ditional meaning.
15  Cf. AT, 213.
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as bearer of truth – is something made and produced, there-
fore “dominated” and inferior towards truth. This is the way 
to understand Adorno’s statement that “redemption through 
semblance is itself illusory” (AT, 107). This constitutes finally 
a dialectical relationship between the artwork’s sensuous being 
and the spirit’s nonexistence; both need the other in order to 
become truth in the means of the other.
Can this kind of truth become accessible to the perceiving 
subject? By pointing to the sensuous appearance of the artwork, 
Adorno aims primarily to a highlighting of the subject’s inevi-
table cognitive limits implied in the process of aesthetic expe-
rience. The reasons for this limitation lie in the partiality16 of 
the blinking truth, appearing during the artwork’s “shuddering 
apparition” (AT, 80). Wellmer aptly points to the “moment of 
blindness” towards the cognition of truth, inscribed in aesthetic 
experience and in the aesthetic image. Thus, artworks remain 
enigmas and the understanding of their truth-content requires 
philosophical reflection (AT, 128), states Adorno, that may 
unveil the complementary aspect of truth, the discursive-con-
ceptual17. What could be the object of a philosophical reflection 
that focuses on an artwork?
Following Adorno’s statement, “The truth of discursive 
knowledge is unshrouded, and thus discursive knowledge does 
not have it; the knowledge that is art, has truth, but as some-
thing incommensurable with art” (AT, 126), Wellmer juxtaposes 
the “blindness of the immediateness of aesthetic experience”, 
as arising from lived perception of the artwork, to the “empti-
ness of philosophical thought”18. Actually, by stressing different 
features of the artwork, Adorno, provides further possibilities 
16  Wellmer, Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung, 143.
17 Ibidem (my translation).
18 Ibidem (my translation).
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beyond this fatal juxtaposition. By pointing namely to the 
unavoidable condition of its sensuous appearance, he has indeed 
not “the immediate existing artwork” (AT, 131) in mind. Thus, 
here, for the artwork’s ontological claim to truth “the issue is” 
its “content [Gehalt]” and not its ephemeral sensuous appear-
ance and the implicit insufficiency of instantaneous aesthetic 
experience as opposed to discursive grasping of truth (AT, 131). 
The understanding of content – with an additional truth-in-
dicator as truth-content – constitutes the culmination of what 
Adorno calls “aesthetic experience as objective understanding”. 
However, whereas comprehension of posited structures within 
Adorno’s very paradigm of artwork – the musical work – in other 
words, moments of reflection during lived experience19, can be 
achieved through a sole encounter with the work, the compre-
hension of its truth-content constitutes a long standing and 
complex process, beyond the reciprocity of “lived experience” 
and comprehension. By defining truth-content, among others20, 
historically, Adorno provides a possibility for artworks to tran-
scend their “posited” nature and semblance character, through 
“their methexis in history and the determinate critique that they 
exercise through their form” (AT, 133). History is factual and, 
insofar, objective, and truth-content of the artwork constitutes 
“unconscious writing of history” (AT, 191-192) through “correct 
[historically] consciousness” of the creator (AT, 191), sedi-
mented in the artwork. Thus, history appears in the artwork as 
not made, crystallized in the truth-content. The understanding 
of the artwork’s truth-content “postulates” critique. Critique 
highlights 
19 See above, note 9.
20 Cf. J.M. Bernstein, The dead speaking of stones and stars, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Critical Theory, ed. Fred Rush, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2004, 157.
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what the artworks say through the configuration of their elements in 
their historical relevance, correlation and overcoming; for instance, a 
new historical era affects their truth-content to the point that they 
may “decline” and “collapse” (AT, 193-194). 
Truth-content, becoming historical as correct consciousness 
objectified in the artwork, tends also to highlight the artwork’s 
historicity, letting it “sink into irrelevance” (AT, 132), a fact that 
criticism brings into attention. Therefore, Adorno’s statement 
that “the historical development of works through critique and 
the philosophical development of their truth-content have 
a reciprocal relation” (AT, 128), means that the ultimate level 
in the interpretation of an artwork, the understanding of its 
truth-content “only” to be “achieved by philosophical reflection” 
(AT, 128), requires the understanding of the work’s “methexis 
in history” and historical development even until “irrelevance”. 
Thus, truth-content acquires a value of objectivity.
Through the objectivity of truth-content implied in the 
artwork and becoming subject for philosophical reflection, 
Adorno approaches his second task, the outlining of art’s 
methexis in truth despite its semblance character. His considera-
tions on the truth-content could also be related to his consider-
ation on artistic form, social content and on the language char-
acter of art; these categories, introduced by Adorno to interpret 
the artwork, point to an idea of intersubjectivity and social 
objectivity. In other words, they refer to sociological aspects of 
the relationship between art and solipsism, mentioned in the 
introduction. They also point to the truth-content’s concreti-
zation, which may clarify his statements on “The problem of 
solipsism” as related to art. As he states, art “carries out the 
critique of solipsism through the force of externalization in its 
own technique as the technique of objectivation. By virtue of 
its form transcends the impoverished entrapped subject” (AT, 
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260). The artwork’s objectivation means, as such, otherness 
from the creative subject. However, this objectivation could just 
constitute a tautological self-projection, though, as mentioned 
above, it is very doubtful that subjective artistic intentions can 
remain intact from the immanent inner antagonisms governing 
the formation of an artwork and molded by the latter. Never-
theless, artistic form, supported by technique, can become the 
“locus of social content” (AT, 230). The social content becomes 
the artwork’s subject (Stoff ) and the “law” of the artistic form 
reifies and orders fissured elements of the empirical world. The 
artwork’s truth-content depends on its opening to this content 
— Adorno’s example is the ugliness and formal complexity 
(“inhuman construction”: AT, 237) of Picassos Guernica. In that 
way, art can externalize and reify its latent social content. Is this 
not just an assertion? Apart from the above outlined correla-
tion between truth-content, objectivity and social content, why 
should the formal design of an artwork imply a social meaning, 
even latently? It seems that the real aesthetic addressee of this 
statement is “genuinely new art”; for the latter, “liberated” form 
becomes the “anathema to the status quo” thus implying the 
“political participation of the unpolitical” (AT, 255).
Respectively, the “individual who produces the artwork is 
an element of reality like others […] not even decisive in the 
factual production” (AT, 167). By facing his work, in every 
correction and departure from the “primary impulse” (AT, 43) 
and intention, the artist works unconsciously as an agent of 
society. It is the invisible “social universal […] watching him 
over his shoulder” (AT, 231). Insofar, the creative artistic indi-
vidual remains an “intervening” factor, a “limiting value” (AT, 
167), necessary for the “crystallization” of the artwork. In this 
context any individuation of the artwork which constitutes an 
emancipation from the creator finally doesn’t imply the delusion 
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of an autarkic l ’art pour l ’art, but a reification of a fait social. The 
“social universal”, as sedimented collective essence, constitutes 
the language character of the artwork (cf AT, 167). Therefore, the 
subject who speaks this language is not a syntactical I but a We, 
once again paradigmatically demonstrated in music: polyphony, 
counterpoint and “harmonic depth dimension” constitute relicts 
of the penetration of the “We of the choric ritual” into tech-
niques of Western Art Music (AT, 167). Thus, both, creator 
and artwork transcend their “impoverished” imprisonment. If 
this imprisonment constitutes an initial subjective illusion of 
autarky of creative forces towards the total formation of the 
artwork, insofar of a solipsistic standpoint, the artwork’s reifica-
tion acquires “historico-philosophical truth of a solipsism that 
is untrue in-itself ” (AT, 42). 
As far as it concerns the second task and the second crite-
rion for evaluation of art’s claim to truth –content, how can art 
have methexis in truth, apart from the historical and societal 
objectivity and concreteness of its truth-content? According to 
Adorno, art is paradoxical because it achieves “what is not made, 
the truth” through “making of particular works”, that is through 
objectivation of a specific work and not through “immediate 
vision” to an abstract, conceptual unity (AT, 131). The “refracted 
existence” of the “nonexistent” — spirit in the artwork, points 
to what the artwork cannot be in its pure Dasein as something 
made and, insofar, in its semblance character. Besides the illu-
sory and semblance character of spirit towards the sphere of 
being according to his subversion of traditional Aesthetics, 
Adorno, following Hegel, also acknowledges the truth value 
of spirit; spirit’s truth is not semblance and illusion. Therefore, 
the artwork as something made, “has truth as semblance of the 
illusionless” (AT, 132) by allowing spirit appear in the sphere of 
being “before the eyes”. Through making of particular works, art 
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casts a view on truth, the unmade. According to Adorno, one of 
the most important merits of an artwork, crucial for its success 
as construction and bearer of meaning, is the coherence it 
displays through the support of technique. An artwork displays 
coherence, if its creator succeeds in mastering the resistance of 
material and the esoteric antagonisms of diffuse elements, thus 
making them appear as reconciled. Coherence in the artwork, 
becomes an aesthetic value, that makes it meaningful thus 
letting it appear as true. However, the elements of reality are 
not thus reconciled. The artwork demonstrates an ideal and illu-
sory “displacement”, a reconciled “constellation” of the elements 
of reality. Once again, Adorno subverts traditional Aesthetics 
by claiming that it is reality that should actually imitate this 
displacement (AT, 132). Wellmer points here to two meanings 
of truth: the nominalistic truth of the particular artwork (T1) or 
what Adorno considers “the truth element of nominalism” (AT, 
108) appearing as aesthetic coherence, and the general truth of 
art as loyal representation of the “multiplicity” – the “other” (AT, 
131), reality constitutes (T2), identified, according to Adorno, 
with nature21. This conflicting multiplicity appears in art and 
insofar art is truth in representing it. But since reconciliation 
of reality is utopic, the truth of the aesthetic coherence of the 
particular work, supported by form and technique, is illusory, 
therefore semblance. To continue Wellmer’s distinction between 
these two kinds of truth and bring it in accordance with Ador-
no’s idea of “truth as semblance of the illusionless”, artworks 
point first through their mere existence (T2) and secondly 
through the demonstration of a reconciled constellation of the 
latter’s diffuse and antagonistic elements of reality (T1) to the 
possibility of the nonexisting and possible respectively. Thus the 
21 Wellmer, Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung, 145.
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truth of art attains a dialectical structure and the artwork an 
immanently antinomic one:
Art is true insofar as what speaks out of it –indeed, it itself– is confli-
cting and unreconciled, but this truth only becomes art’s own when 
it synthesizes what is fractured and thus makes its irreconcilability 
determinate. Paradoxically, art must testify to the unreconciled and at 
the same time envision its reconciliation (AT, 168).
Is there any ontological locus for both kinds of truth to merge 
together as “possibility of the nonexisting and possible”? Due to 
their semblance character towards the truth of spirit, artworks 
are endangered to appear as just depended from it and pure 
manifestations of longing (for truth). Apart from this ontolog-
ical longing, the power of artworks arises from the objectivity 
of their truth-content through their methexis in history. This 
is the way to understand Adorno’s statement that “they would 
be powerless if they were no more than longing” (AT, 132). In 
fact, there is a “neediness, inscribed as a figure in the historically 
existing”, thus also in the artwork as historical product. That 
means, that the artwork’s neediness is an immanent and objective 
characteristic that manifests itself as need for change and fulfill-
ment. Repeatedly, Adorno refers to this dimension of artworks 
and to the history of art as permanent process, not necessarily of 
“tranquil development”, but of improvement of what “remained 
unresolved” (AT, 19) in the old, paradigmatically demonstrated 
in his support and historically holistic view of “New Music”. 
But the question remains: how is it possible that an artwork, as 
semblance and something made, can express and bear an objective 
truth? From the objectivity and, thus, ontic autarky of neediness, 
Adorno returns to the idea of longing of the artworks. The object 
of that longing is “the reality of what is not” (AT, 132). This is 
the envisioning of a reconciliation of the irreconcilable in reality. 
Adorno adheres here to the platonic distinction between the 
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world of ideas and the world of sensuous being. Accordingly, the 
artwork’s longing for truth is transformed to remembrance, the 
Platonic anamnesis of the world of ideas. Remembrance refers 
to a mode of being and not being; to the past, which constitutes 
a mode of fulfilled being (Adorno does not explicate it) that, 
however, does not anymore exist. Adorno considers the object of 
anamnesis as concretization of utopia without a betrayal in the 
sphere of existence; utopia namely, does not exist and according 
to Adorno’s philosophical vocabulary, it remains semblance. 
At the same time, the object of anamnesis remains bound up 
with reality as cognitive performance of a subject, therefore his 
reference to Proust’s memoire involontaire (based on external 
stimuli). By linking semblance to remembrance he can save the 
former as connected to reality and demonstrate a privileged locus 
for an unproven truth. And an unproven truth can be experi-
enced individually in such a cognitive performance as anam-
nesis is, in other words, solipsistic. But this has to remain in the 
realm of the aesthetic. Because, as he states, “extra-aesthetically 
solipsism confuses aesthetic semblance with truth” (AT, 43).
This constitutes perhaps an additional guilt, art has to carry 
on.
IV. Postscript 
Despite his critique, Adorno’s emphasis on the subjective point 
of reference in art reveals Kantian influences. He deliberately 
separates Kant’s statements by emphasizing “universality and 
implicit necessity” of the aesthetic judgment. Kant’s efforts, 
to establish “a subjective mediated but objective aesthetics” are 
contradictory not due to his reference to concepts (i.e. univer-
sality and necessity) as criteria of aesthetic judgments but due 
to his reliance on their exclusivity and functionality in validating 
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objective judgment in the realm of the aesthetic. Actually, 
universality and necessity arise from an immanent and initial 
“belief ” of the experiencing subject; this of having a “universal 
voice” that lays “claim to the agreement of everyone”. This kind 
of belief, constituting an important part of aesthetic experience, 
implies an initial solipsistic attitude. However, since it “requires 
agreement from everyone, as an instance of the rule”22 and, 
insofar, as premise of objective validation, the Kantian theory 
of aesthetic judgment confirms subjectivism, as external to the 
artwork, topos. The tangibility and objectivity of Adorno’s idea 
of aesthetic truth is, however, located in the artwork itself, espe-
cially in the phenomenal transformation of its latent histori-
cal-social content and in the ideal constellation of elements of 
reality, which he masterfully salvages as appearances of truth 
and concretized utopia. The initial, solipsistic beliefs of both, 
creator and spectator on their primary intentions and impres-
sions respectively, may find a hopeless verification, thus revealing 
“most progressive consciousness”. 
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